The Government Securities Act gave the Treasury Department some rulemaking authority over all government securities brokers and dealers. But the act also required these firms to register with the SEC.

The financial crisis and the Great Recession posed the most significant macroeconomic challenges for the United States in a half-century, leaving behind high unemployment and below-target inflation and calling for highly accommodative monetary policies.

Loss-absorbing capacity among banks is substantially higher as a result of both regulatory requirements and stress testing exercises.

The sale of Treasury bonds, notes, and bills finances the U.S. government, and those securities are, in turn, a primary vehicle for savings for a wide range of U.S. households. Treasury securities are also an important source of collateral within the financial system.

The expectation of gradual policy normalization should reduce the likelihood of outsized movements in interest rates.

Mobile devices, high-speed data communication, and online commerce are creating expectations that convenient, secure, real-time payment and banking capabilities should be available whenever and wherever they are needed.

In normal times, at the beginning of each month, the federal government makes a cash advance to the Social Security Trust Fund called the 'normalized tax transfer,' in an amount equal to the estimated payroll taxes for the coming month.

It is worth noting that 'too big to fail' is not simply about size. A big institution is 'too big' when there is an expectation that government will do whatever it takes to rescue that institution from failure, thus bestowing an effective risk premium subsidy. Reforms to end 'too big to fail' must address the causes of this expectation.

The United States has never prioritized or failed to pay any obligation when due during a debt limit impasse. Despite the institutional risks and the lack of clear legal authority, we assume that Treasury will attempt to prioritize payments in a last-ditch effort to avoid default.

There is certainly a role for regulation, but regulation should always take into account the impact that it has on markets, a balance that must be constantly weighed.

Legislative reforms in the 1990s and the public/private structure led managements to expand the GSEs' balance sheets to enormous size, underpinned by wafer-thin slivers of capital, driving high shareholder returns and very high compensation for management.

It is quite plausible that the process of increased fragmentation of production across borders is subject to 'diminishing returns' and has its natural limits.

While monetary policy can contribute to growth by supporting a durable expansion in a context of price stability, it cannot reliably affect the long-run sustainable level of the economy's growth.

One factor that favors easier adjustment in EMEs is that U.S. monetary policy normalization has been and should continue to be gradual, as long as the U.S. economy evolves roughly as expected.

The GSEs became powerful advocates for their own bottom lines, providing substantial financial support for political candidates who supported the GSE agenda.

As with so many sectors of the economy, technology is transforming the retail banking sector.

The banking industry has traditionally been characterized by physical branches, privileged access to financial data, and distinct expertise in analyzing such data.

With customers' permission, fintech firms have increasingly turned to data aggregators to 'screen scrape' information from financial accounts. In such cases, data aggregators collect and store online banking logins and passwords provided by the bank's customers and use them to log directly into the customer's banking account.

There is clear empirical evidence that the response of EME financial markets to different shocks, including changes in U.S. interest rates, depends importantly on the state of economic fundamentals in the EMEs themselves.

As long as global financial conditions normalize in an orderly fashion, EMEs should have sufficient time to adjust.

The TMPG is the place where market participants recognize and address their responsibilities to each other.

We do take seriously our obligation to assess whether our reforms are achieving their desired effects without imposing unnecessary burden.

We need a system that provides mortgage credit in good times and bad to a broad range of creditworthy borrowers.

Congress created Fannie Mae in 1938 and Freddie Mac in 1970. For many years, these institutions prudently pursued their core mission of enhancing the availability of credit for housing.

A risk-insensitive leverage ratio can be a useful backstop to risk-based capital requirements. But such a ratio can have perverse incentives if it is the binding capital requirement because it treats relatively safe activities, such as central clearing, as equivalent to the most risky activities.

Liquidity problems can occur in central clearing, even if all counterparties have the financial resources to meet their obligations, if they are unable to convert those resources into cash quickly enough.

Regulatory changes have forced banks to closely examine their liquidity planning and to internalize the costs of liquidity provision. The costs of committed liquidity facilities will be passed on to clearing members. These costs are perhaps highest in clearing Treasury securities, where liquidity needs can be especially large.

We need a national focus on increasing the sustainable growth rate of our economy.

While the move to central clearing has made the system safer, we need to make sure that the central counterparties have the resources and risk-management practices to withstand plausible but severe shocks.

The Federal Reserve seeks to support MDIs in a number of ways, including our Partnership for Progress, our program for outreach and technical assistance to MDIs.

The Fed's organization reflects a long-standing desire in American history to ensure that power over our nation's monetary policy and financial system is not concentrated in a few hands, whether in Washington or in high finance or in any single group or constituency.

The question of how to structure our nation's financial system arose in the early years of the republic.

Against this backdrop of technological change and heightened expectations, it is worth remembering our broad public policy objectives, which are driven by the fundamental importance of the payments system in our society.

The Congress has tasked the Federal Reserve with achieving stable prices and maximum employment - the dual mandate.

Our discussions of the economy may sometimes ring in the ears of the public with more certainty than is appropriate.

Long-term economic growth depends mainly on nonmonetary factors such as population growth and workforce participation, the skills and aptitudes of our workforce, the tools at their disposal, and the pace of technological advance. Fiscal and regulatory policies can have important effects on these factors.

The main long-run contribution monetary policy can make is to provide a stable macroeconomic and financial environment.

Over time, low rates can put pressure on the business models of financial institutions.

Real short- and long-term rates were relatively high in the late-1990s, so financial excess can also arise without a low-rate environment.

If the public understands the central bank's views on the economy and monetary policy, then households and businesses will take those views into account in making their spending and investment plans; policy will be more effective as a result.

My own experience is that the best outcomes are reached when opposing viewpoints are clearly and strongly presented before decisions are made.

Central banking often comes across as obscure and complicated, and we try to help the public understand what we do.

Below-target inflation increases the real value of debts owed by households and businesses and reduces the ability of central banks to respond to downturns.

The only way to ensure that inflation expectations remain safely anchored near the FOMC's target is to keep inflation close to that target on a consistent basis.

The financial crisis and the Great Recession left firms with excess capacity, reducing incentives to invest. If businesses expect slower growth to continue, that will also hold down investment.

The FOMC has considerable control over short-term interest rates. We have much less influence over long-term rates, which are set in the marketplace.

Given that trade benefited the Asian economies on the way up, it seems natural that the slowdown in global trade, whatever its causes, could lead to some loss of dynamism and growth in the region.

To ensure financial stability, we expect the provision of U.S. government securities settlement services to be robust in nearly all contingencies.

The longer workers are unemployed, the greater the likelihood that their skills will erode and workers will lose attachment to the labor force, permanently damaging the economy's dynamism and potential output.

By purchasing and holding large amounts of Treasury securities and MBS, we put additional downward pressure on term premiums and so on long-term rates.